EELV Program Reaches Maturity

The EELV is the cornerstone launch technology for the future of the U.S. satellite program.

By Marco A. Caceres

Last year was a transitional year for the U.S. military launch services industry. Both rockets that will launch the vast portion of the satellites for the Department of Defense (DoD) during the next two decades posted successful maiden missions.

Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V was launched on August 21 from Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL. After several months of delays due to some software glitches and a general desire to err on the side of caution by engineers, Boeing’s Delta IV was finally launched November 20, from Launch Complex 37B at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.

The launches of the Atlas V and Delta IV marked the culmination of nearly a decade’s worth of work to develop a new generation of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) for the U.S. military as part of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program.

EELV was first conceived in 1994, following a four-month study by a Pentagon task force charged by Congress (in the fiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Act) to come up with a plan to modernize U.S. space launch capabilities. Keep in mind that this was the third in a series of three attempts at fleet modernization.

The previous programs, the National Launch System (NLS) and Spacelifter, had sought to develop a launcher from scratch with next-generation technology. But both were doomed from the start, as Congress was unwilling to approve anything near the estimated $10 billion price tag for a new vehicle. Nor was DoD open to sacrificing other programs to help make up for any funding differences. NLS and Spacelifter were cancelled in 1991 and 1993 respectively.

The task force’s report was approved by Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutsch, on May 7, 1994, and submitted to the White House. The report outlined four options: (1) sustain existing Atlas, Delta and Titan rockets; (2) evolve a new expendable launch system; (3) develop a so-called clean-sheet expendable launch vehicle to replace Atlas, Delta and Titan; and (4) develop a reusable launch vehicle at a cost of $6 billion to $20 billion.

In August 1994, President Clinton signed the National Space Transportation Policy, which gave DoD the primary responsibility for developing a new generation of ELVs based on the existing U.S. fleet. It directed DoD and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to work together as much as possible in the effort. It ruled out development and deployment of a new U.S. rocket for the “foreseeable future”.

EELV was the result of the realization with DoD that there was simply not enough money in the budget for a completely new launch vehicle. In short, it was a compromise between desirability and affordability. The idea was to save money by building on existing technology.

One of the main goals of EELV was to reduce the cost of launching DoD satellites. That meant that the primary focus would be on reducing the cost of heavy-lift missions, notably Titan 4-class launches, which were by far the most expensive. Each Titan 4 mission cost an average of $350 million, which meant that, without a cheaper alternative, the Air Force would spend more than $5 billion on its projected 15 heavy-lift missions through 2020. It estimated it would spend approximately $20 billion on just under 200 total projected launches through the end of the next decade.

With EELV, the Air Force hoped to cut its heavy-lift mission costs by about 50 percent and its overall launch mission costs by at least 25 percent.

The U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMSC) released on May 17, 1995, a request for proposal (RFP) for the concept validation phase of the EELV program. Industry responses to the RFP were due on June 16, 1995.

On August 24, 1995, SMSC awarded EELV Phase I concept validation contracts to four contractor teams led by Alliant Techsystems Aerospace Systems Group of Magna, UT; Boeing Expendable Launch Systems (then known as McDonnell Douglas Aerospace-West) of Huntington Beach, CA; Boeing Missiles & Space Division of Seattle, WA; and Lockheed Martin Astronautics Group of Denver, CO. Each of the 15-month, $30 million contracts called for developing cost- and risk-reduction concepts for upgrades to existing launchers and their ground support infrastructure.

The Air Force made its down-select on December 20, 1996, and awarded EELV pre-development engineering and manufacturing contracts to the teams of Boeing Expendable Launch Systems and Lockheed Martin Astronautics for Delta IV and Atlas V. The two $60 million firm fixed contracts were scheduled for completion by May 1998.

Boeing’s primary team member was Rocketdyne Propulsion & Power of Canoga Park, CA. Rocketdyne was tasked with developing the RS-68 liquid-oxygen/liquid-hydrogen main engine for the Delta IV. The RS-68 is the first cryogenic engine built in the U.S. since the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME).

Other major Delta IV subcontractors include Alliant Techsystems Aerospace Systems of Magna, UT; AlliedSignal Aerospace of Teterboro, NJ; Howmet International of Hampton, VA; L-3 Telemetry-East of Newton, PA; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Tokyo, Japan; Moog Space Products of East Aurora, NY; Pressure Systems of Commerce, CA; and Thiokol Propulsion of Odgen, UT.

Lockheed Martin’s principal partner was the RD AMROSS joint venture between NPO Energomash of Khimky, Russia, and Pratt & Whitney Space Propulsion Operation of West Palm Beach, FL. RD AMROSS was given responsibility for the RD-180 liquid-oxygen/kerosene main engine for the Atlas V. The RD-180 is a two-chamber version of Energomash’s RD-170 engine.

Additional subcontractors for Atlas V include Aerojet of Sacramento, CA; Alliant Techsystems’ Aerospace Composites Structures of Clearfield, UT; CASA Space of Madrid, Spain; Contraves Space of Zurich, Switzerland; Honeywell Space Systems of Clearwater, FL; and Primex Aerospace of Redmond, WA.

In November 1997, the Air Force approved a plan to develop the Atlas V and Delta IV EELVs, rather than just one of them. The reason being is that two EELV production lines would ensure the government’s access to space and improve flexibility in designing satellites. The additional cost of maintaining two EELV launch infrastructures would supposedly be offset by more competitive pricing.

On October 16, 1998, the Air Force awarded Boeing a $1.37 billion contract for 19 EELV missions and Lockheed Martin a $650 million contract for nine missions. Each company also received a $500 million contract for EELV engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) work, which called for demonstration flights of the medium-lift rocket in 2000 and the heavy-lift vehicle in 2003.

The successful launches of the medium-lift models of the Atlas V and Delta IV rockets in 2002 fulfills (albeit a couple of years late) part of the EMD segment of the Air Force EELV contract to Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin plan to launch the heavy-lift models of their vehicles this year. It is believed that the first Atlas V 500 series vehicle will launch the Inmarsat 4-F1 commercial broadband communications satellite for the International Mobile Satellite Organization. The first Delta IV-Heavy may carry the last Defense Support Program (DSP) early-warning satellite for the Air Force.

More notably, though, last year’s Atlas V and Delta IV launches officially signal the beginning of the end for mainstay launch programs of the Air Force—such as Lockheed Martin’s Titan 4 rocket and Atlas II. There are about half a dozen of Titan 4B rockets and perhaps another four Atlas IIA rockets scheduled during the next two years. The last Atlas IIA was launched on December 5, 2002. The mission carried the TDRS-J communications satellite for NASA.

It is also conceivable that Boeing could phase out Delta II within the next couple of years. However, a good case can be made to keep this program alive for the foreseeable future. Delta II has launches scheduled through 2006, and there is no overlap between its capabilities and those of the Delta IV-Medium. While the Delta IV-Medium is more of a medium-to-heavy-lift vehicle, the Delta II is a true medium-sized launcher. With that said, it does appear that Delta II has peaked in terms of activity. Its best year ever was in 1998, when Delta II posted 12 launches—all successful. Since then, the program’s numbers have steadily declined.

Clearly, access to space for the U.S. military over the long-term will depend on Atlas V and Delta IV. The key question, though, is… “Will there be sufficient military launch business for both programs to remain viable?” Note that Boeing and Lockheed Martin each decided to invest $1 billion of their own money into EELV with the understanding that some of the models developed under this program would be marketed commercially. That understanding, in turn, was based on the assumption that there would be a vibrant commercial launch market that would more than make up for the costs of development.

For Boeing, the stagnant commercial launch market is less of an issue than it is for Lockheed Martin, since the company owns the bulk (now 21) of the launch orders for DoD thus far. But this advantage could quickly change with one just one failed mission. EELV provides DoD with a wider range of alternatives for launching its payloads, which means greater pressure for both the Atlas V and Delta IV rockets to perform as expected. At present, there is no significant alternative market for these programs.

Marco A. Caceres is Senior Analyst and Director of Space Studies at Teal Group Corp., a Fairfax, VA, aerospace and defense consulting firm serving both industry and the government.